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4T
he public opinion survey 
that the REScEU project 
conducted at the end of 
2016 revealed that most 
citizens living in the largest EU 
member states (excluding the UK) 
still believe in the EU and are rea-
dy to support a number of policy 
reforms aimed at constructively 
responding to the lines of confli-
ct now characterizing EU politics 
(Ferrera and Pellegata 2017). Our 
data show that even most Ger-
man citizens would support the 
introduction of EU-wide solidarity 
mechanisms. If this is the case, 
how is it possible that Eurosceptic 
minorities make the headlines all 
over the continent in public deba-
tes? Why have the solidaristic at-
titudes revealed by our and other 
surveys1 been ignored during the 
political management of the crisis? 
To explore these puzzling que-
stions, the REScEU project has 
undertaken a second survey ai-
ming to tap elite attitudes. If the 
“supply” of more solidaristic poli-
cies is not in line with the poten-
tial demand for them, then it is 
precisely to national political elites 
that we should turn our attention. 
If there is anything missing in Eu-
ropean politics, it is not a pro-Eu-
ropean electoral and social con-
stituency but political leaders who 
are able to give a voice to this si-
lent majority.
Our elite survey has investigated 
national samples of Members of 
Parliament (MPs) with the aim of 
examining:
•   Their positioning on the four 
political divides identified by the 
REScEU theoretical framework: 
1) EU mission (euro-liberal vs. eu-
ro-social), 2) cross-national solida-
rity (the readiness to help weaker 
member states), 3) free movement 
and cross-borders welfare rights 
(open or restricted), and 4) supra-
national integration vs. national 
sovereignty;
•   Attitudes toward policies and 
initiatives aimed at strengthening 
the social dimension of the EU;
•   Opinions on the nature of the 
REScEU’s élite survey
1 See, for instance, the TransSol report 3.1 of June 2017, illustrating the results of their survey on individual forms of European so-
lidarity (https://blogs.uni-siegen.de/transsol/files/2017/07/D3.1-integrated-WP3-report.pdf) and results of the survey conducted in 
the framework of the Transnational European Solidarity Study (TEES) discussed in Gerhards et al. (2018).
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current European crisis;
•   Evaluations of the role of Ger-
many and their own country du-
ring the crisis;
•   Opinions about the referendum 
on Brexit, its consequences, and 
post-Brexit scenarios (mainly in 
the United Kingdom);
•   Value/ideological orientations, 
international profile and networ-
king activities, political back-
ground, and socio-demographic 
status.
The elite survey was conducted 
between the Spring of 2017 and 
the Spring of 2018. 
51. 
Political elites are more prone 
than public opinions of their 
countries to support the idea 
of an European Union whose 
main mission is to ensure fiscal 
stability. 
2.
MPs interviewed express high 
levels of support for the free 
movement principle and the 
mobility of citizens and wor-
kers. 
3.
A clear majority of national repre-
sentatives expresses a high level 
of diffuse support for the EU and 
believes that their countries have 
generally benefited from member-
ship in the EU. However, in all the 
countries analysed (especial-
ly in Italy, Poland, and the UK) 
after the outbreak of the Euro 
crisis, the level of diffuse sup-
port for the EU decreased.
4.
A relevant North/South divide 
emerges among political elites 
for what concerns support for 
pan-European solidarity. 
5.
The core/periphery divide also 
emerges regarding the MPs’ 
opinions about the behaviour 
of Germany during the econo-
mic crisis and the general evalua-
tion of Angela Merkel.
6.
National representatives tend 
to disagree about the potential 
way out of the crisis. 
7.
Cross-country differences, 
especially along the North/
South divide, are much more 
pronounced among national 
representatives than in public 
opinion among their nationals. 
8.
MPs’ ideological orientations 
and their partisan affiliation 
display a strong predictive 
power. 
9.
Apart from the UK, most poli-
tical elites tend to believe that 
calling a referendum on a com-
plex issue such as Brexit was a 
mistake.
 
10.
British political elites are hi-
ghly polarised along party lines 
concerning the consequences 
of the Brexit referendum and 
post-Brexit scenarios. While 
most Conservative MPs believe 
that the British government should 
not call a new referendum on the 
UK-EU agreement, the majority of 
Labour and Scottish national MPs 
have an opposite opinion on this 
issue.
Key findings2
6Country Population Sample Proportion
France 556 60 11%
Germany 709 63 9%
Italy 630 75 12%
Poland 460 41 9%
Spain 350 59 17%
Sweden 343 69 20%
United Kingdom 650 22 3%
TOTAL 389 Mean: 11,5%
Research design and 
methodology3
T
he REScEU Elite Survey 
focused exclusively on 
representatives of natio-
nal parliaments (in tho-
se countries with bicameral sy-
stems, interviews were sampled 
in the chamber with the highest 
political attributions, namely the 
lower chamber) in the same se-
ven countries already included in 
the REScEU Mass Survey: Fran-
ce, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom.
C
onducting large-scale 
elite surveys often pre-
sents additional pro-
blems compared to 
those applying to the national 
public such as the difficulties of 
gaining access to interviews and 
MPs’ reluctance to answer que-
stions that are outside the scope 
of their expertise or that they are 
uncomfortable with. To these pro-
blems we should add the limited 
resources for the fieldwork stage. 
The minimum number of inter-
views was originally set to 70 in 
countries with large parliaments 
(more than 500 members) and to 
50 in those with fewer seats. Na-
tional samples are the following:
Sample3.1
7EP political group Population Observations Groups
(reaggregation)
Obs.
(reaggregation)
GUE/NGL 27 32 Left & Greens 53
Green 35 21
S&D 116 119 S&D 119
ALDE 23 43 ALDE 43
EPP 114 83 EPP 83
ECR 45 23
Right 58EFDD 43 26
ENF 27 9
En Marche (no Eurogroup) 21 En Marche 21
Non Attached 11 12 Non Attached 12
TOTAL 389 389
N
ational samples presen-
ted here include only 
those MPs who have 
answered at least 50% 
of the questionnaire. Post-stratifi-
cation weights and analyses that 
follow are based on these distribu-
tions. 
Although we were not able to re-
ach the original target in all the 
sample countries, on average, 
national samples represent 11.5% 
of the total population, which is 
in line with existing cross-country 
elite surveys. There are some dif-
C
ountry samples were 
designed to be as repre-
sentative as possible of 
the actual composition 
of the national parliaments in ter-
ms of partisan affiliation. Size of the 
parliamentary groups was chosen 
as the main criteria for stratifica-
tion. Looking at the pooled sam-
ple, respondents can be clustered 
according to their party affiliation 
to different political groups of the 
European Parliament:
ferences among the seven sam-
ple countries. The British House 
of Commons is underrepresented 
with only 3% of members inter-
viewed, while the Swedish Parlia-
ment is slightly overrepresented 
(20% of members interviewed).
8U
nfortunately, some par-
ty groups in the Europe-
an Parliaments are re-
presented only by a few 
respondents. This undermines 
the possibility of conducting ap-
propriate statistical analyses on 
the data. Therefore, for ease of 
presentation, we have decided 
to re-aggregate the MPs who 
answered our survey along the 
main political families present in 
most European party systems. 
More precisely, members of ra-
dical Left parties (GUE/NGL) 
and Greens are grouped into the 
category called “Left & Greens,” 
which represents the “new left” 
(the “GAL” pole of the GAL-TAN 
scale). On the other extreme, 
representatives of parties be-
longing to the three right-wing 
groups (ECR, EFDD, and ENF) 
Seniority
Previous experience 
at the executive level
Role in assembly
or commission
Newcomer More legislatures No experience
Previous 
experience
Ordinary 
member
Parliamentary 
role
51,4% 48,6% 72,8% 27,2% 84,6% 15,4%
2 See https://www.chesdata.eu/ for data and documentation on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.
are clustered in the category 
called “Right,” which represen-
ts the “TAN” pole of the GAL-
TAN scale. We have decided to 
consider French representatives 
belonging to “La Republique en 
Marche” as a separate category 
given that, at the time of the 
survey, this party was not affilia-
ted to any political group in the 
European Parliament. Twelve 
respondents who are not atta-
ched to any EP political group 
are usually excluded from the 
analyses by partisan affiliation.
A
lthough this choice is 
forced by the low num-
ber of members belon-
ging to some political 
groups and, consequently, by 
the low number of respondents 
in the survey, it might be que-
stionable from a theoretical 
point of view. Thus, to justify our 
choice, we have analysed the 
positions of different parties ac-
cording to the Chapel Hill Exper-
ts Survey (CHES) on the general 
Left-Right scale, the economic 
Left-Right scale, the cultural 
Left-Right scale (GAL-TAN), and 
their general orientations toward 
European integration2.  Along 
all these policy and ideological 
dimensions, CHES data clearly 
show that different left-wing and 
green parties included in our 
survey show very similar orien-
tations, as do right-wing parties.
In terms of political profile, our 
sample presents the following 
distributions:
9M
ore than half of the 
MPs who participa-
ted in our survey are 
experiencing their 
first legislature, and only 27.2% 
of them had previous executive 
experience at the local, regional, 
or national level. Finally, 15.4% 
of the sample has a role (secre-
tary, speaker, vice-president, 
or president) in the national as-
sembly or in a commission, whi-
le 84.6% of them are ordinary 
members.
Gender Age Education
Male Female < 50 years old > 50 years old No universitydegree
University
degree
70,5% 29,5% 33,4% 66,6% 27% 73%
30% of our pooled sample is re-
presented by females, a percen-
tage very close to that of the po-
pulation (35%), while two thirds 
of respondents were at least 50 
years old. 73% of the sample is 
represented by MPs who have a 
university degree.
In terms of socio-demographic 
status, the MPs included in the 
sample are distributed as fol-
lows:
10
3 See http://www.laps.unisi.it/
Country
Legislatures
covered
Initial
date
End
date
Average
duration
Min.
duration
Max.
duration
France 14th, 15th 28 March 2017 23 May 2018 14min 45sec 5min 15sec 35min 36sec
Germany 18th, 19th 16 March 2017 23 May 2018 18min 48sec 6min 26sec 57min 7sec
Italy 17th 13 March 2017 23 May 2018 18min 41sec 6min 15sec 1h 10min 16sec
Poland 8th 21 March 2017 18 May 2018 21min 52sec 9min 28sec 48min 43sec
Spain 12th 15 March 2017 06 May 2018 17min 57sec 7min 15sec 43min 50sec
Sweden 2014-2018 14 March 2017 11 April 2018 16min 25sec 9min 20sec 30min 27sec
United Kingdom 2015-20172017-ongoing 27 March 2017 04 April 2018 15min 16sec 6min 43sec 34min 0sec
T
he survey has been de-
veloped and conducted 
under the framework 
of the REScEU project 
“Reconciling Economic and So-
cial Europe: Values, Ideas, and 
Politics” (Grant no 340534, P.I. 
Maurizio Ferrera) funded by an 
Advanced Grant of the Europe-
an Research Council (ERC).
The survey has been conducted 
in the seven countries listed 
above between March 2017 
and May 2018 adopting the 
CAWI (Computer Assisted Web 
Interviews) method. The que-
stionnaire was originally deve-
loped in English and then tran-
slated to the other languages 
by native speakers. Translations 
were cross-checked by different 
professional translators. The 
survey questionnaire has been 
uploaded online and admini-
stered through the web survey 
management platform of the 
LAPS (Laboratorio per le Analisi 
Politiche e Sociali) based at the 
University of Siena, Italy.3  The 
survey was conducted by seven 
country experts hired by Centro 
di Ricerca e Documentazione 
“Luigi Einaudi” based in Turin, 
Italy and supervised by Alessan-
dro Pellegata of the University of 
Milan (Italy).
Fieldwork and 
methods3.2
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I
n analysing and interpreting 
the results that emerge from 
the REScEU Elite survey, we 
should consider several ca-
veats that typically apply to lar-
ge-scale elite surveys on natio-
nal MPs:
• The sample size is quite 
small. This is also because the 
number of countries sampled 
and, as a consequence, the 
entire population on which we 
have built the sample – national 
representatives – is small. This 
aspect should induce scholars 
to be cautious in generalising 
the results.
• Some countries are un-
derrepresented compared to 
others. This is especially the 
case for the UK. However, it is 
important to note that the que-
stionnaire administered to Briti-
sh respondents mainly focuses 
on MPs’ attitudes toward Brexit. 
This aspect excludes the UK 
from most of the comparative 
analyses.
• Some parties are un-
derrepresented compared to 
T
o correct misrepresen-
tation in the sample, 
we applied two different 
post-stratification wei-
ghts when we conducted our 
analyses:
• Country size in the EP X 
party affiliation in the EP: this 
weight allows us to adjust our 
sample for the number of repre-
sentatives that each member 
state has in the European Par-
liament and, at the same time, 
for the number of MPs affiliated 
with each political group in the 
European Parliament. This wei-
ght has been used for analyses 
conducted on the pooled sam-
ple of respondents.
• Partisan affiliation in 
the national parliaments: this 
weight allows us to adjust our 
sample for the number of MPs 
belonging to each party repre-
sented in the national parlia-
ments of the member states 
included in the sample. It has 
been used for cross-country 
comparisons.
others. This is true especially 
for small right-wing parties who-
se members have Euroscep-
tic orientations and feel less 
comfortable with a question-
naire entirely devoted to topics 
such as EU integration and Eu-
ropean solidarity.
• In relation to the previous 
point, it is worth noting that in 
countries adopting majoritarian 
electoral systems (France and 
the UK), some interesting par-
ties that are strongly underre-
presented in their national par-
liaments are not represented in 
the survey (e.g. Front National 
and UKIP).
Caveats 
and weights3.3
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T
he analyses that follow 
aim to present the most 
relevant findings that 
emerged from the RE-
ScEU Elite Survey. The tables and 
figures show frequency distri-
butions of the answers respon-
dents gave to questions about 
their general attitudes toward 
EU integration and EU-wide so-
lidarity and their preferences for 
specific initiatives and policies 
aiming to strengthen the Euro-
pean Social Union. For all those 
items included in the REScEU 
Mass Survey, MPs’ attitudes are 
compared with opinions expres-
sed by the general public to de-
tect similarities and differences 
between them.
W
e present the ag-
gregate view obtai-
ned from the po-
oled sample of 
respondents, but we also make 
cross-country comparisons 
between political elites and pu-
blic opinions. We also break 
down elites’ attitudes by their 
affiliation to the main party fa-
milies present in most European 
party systems and the European 
Parliament.
T
he report also displays 
several significant asso-
ciations between natio-
nal representatives’ atti-
tudes and preferences and their 
background features. Apart 
from their partisan affiliation and 
ideological leanings, we consi-
dered aspects such as the MPs’ 
international profiles (EUpolita-
nism) and their networking, me-
asured through their affiliation to 
interest groups, think tanks, and 
trade unions or associated cate-
gories. Furthermore, we analy-
sed the seniority of legislators, 
their role in the parliament, and 
their previous political experien-
ce at the local, regional, and na-
tional levels. Finally, we consi-
dered their socio-demographic 
characteristics: gender, age, 
education, and occupation be-
fore entering the parliament.
Main lines of 
inquiry3.4
13
The four lines of 
conflict on European 
integration and 
solidarity
4
D
uring the last couple of 
decades, the EU has wi-
tnessed a growing ten-
sion between the social 
and economic dimensions of inte-
gration. The REScEU project has 
broken down this tension into four 
distinct lines of conflict:
1
The first revolves around the 
policy priorities and overall 
mission of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and 
pits the supporters of a neo-libe-
ral project centred on market-ma-
king and monetary/fiscal stability 
against a euro-social, growth/
employment-oriented project sup-
ported by public investments and 
accompanied by a stronger social 
dimension. L
et us examine the results 
of our elite survey for each 
of the four lines of conflict. 
For most of the tables and 
figures, we will compare the resul-
ts of both the mass and the elite 
surveys.
2
The second line of conflict 
has to do with the issue of 
fiscal stability and, ultima-
tely, cross-national tran-
sfers. The major divide here – core 
against peripheral Member States 
– is rooted in economic interests 
and highly entrenched in cultural 
worldviews and mainly runs from 
North to South.
3
The third line has to do 
with free movement, soli-
darity vis-à-vis outsiders, 
and access to domestic 
welfare on the side of other EU na-
tionals. On one hand, we find the 
supporters of pan-European free 
movement and non-discrimina-
tion; on the other hand, there are 
supporters of social and cultural 
closure. This line of conflict has a 
recognisable geographical dimen-
sion running from East to West.
4
Finally, the fourth line of 
conflict concerns the 
“powers of Brussels” vis-
à-vis the defence of do-
mestic models and practices, 
especially in the social sphere. Eu-
rosceptical formations have taken 
root almost everywhere, increa-
sing in strength and impact. In ad-
dition to the theme of immigration 
and, more generally, of ‘’opening,” 
Eurosceptic parties point the fin-
ger at the excessive bureaucracy 
and technocratic nature of the 
decisions of Brussels, claiming a 
return to “peoples’ self-determina-
tion.”
Figure 1.
The Mission of the EU by member state.
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A
t the aggregate level, 
political elites tend to 
assign more weight to 
market-making (52.7%) 
than to market-correcting. This is 
in rather stark contrast with public 
opinions, which tend to prefer a 
more socially oriented EU (39.1%). 
The market-making preference is 
shared by the majority of MPs in 
the various countries except for 
Italy and Spain, whose elites show 
a greater alignment with mass 
opinions. By contrast, in France, 
Germany, Poland, and Sweden, 
while public opinions tend to be 
more oriented toward market-cor-
recting, political elites tend to be 
more oriented toward market-ma-
king.
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The mission of the EU: 
strengthening or 
correcting the power 
of markets?
4.1
Figure 2.
The mission of the EU by party affiliation.
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Note: Wording of the question: “In your opinion, which of the following objectives 
should be given top priority at the EU level? 1) Ensuring fiscal stability as well as the 
international competitiveness of the EU industry; 2) Ensuring high levels of social 
protection and social welfare for all EU citizens.”
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A 
breakdown by partisan 
affiliation shows that MPs 
whose party is linked to 
the Left & Greens and to 
the Social-Democrats are strongly 
in favour of market-correcting. Li-
berals and Populars are strongly 
in favour of market-making. Ri-
ght-wing MPs seem to be polari-
sed: 57.6% of them are pro mar-
ket-making while the other 42.4% 
support market-correcting, pre-
sumably to promote protectionist 
measures to safeguard national 
economies.
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Table 1.
The Mission of the EU 
by background features of MPs.
Marketing
making
Marketing
correcting N
L-R self-placement
Left 14,1% 85,9% 133 100%
Centre 64,7% 35,3% 149 100%
Right 79,1& 20,9% 81 100%
Trade union membership/affiliation
Not a member 64,9% 35,1% 187 100%
Member 39,4% 60,6% 166 100%
Job in the public sector
Private 64,2% 35,8% 165 100%
Public 44,4% 55,6% 167 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
T
here is a strong associa-
tion between opinions on 
the mission of the EU and 
ideological leanings, with 
right-wing MPs being more orien-
ted toward market-making. MPs 
who are members of a trade union 
or a professional category tend to 
support market-correcting, while 
those who are not members pre-
fer market-making. Job experien-
ces before entering parliament are 
also associated with opinions on 
the EU mission. MPs who were 
employed in the public sector tend 
to prefer the market-correcting 
option.
T
his figure shows respon-
ses related to the second 
line of conflict, which es-
sentially refers to the clash 
between the logic of fiscal stability, 
austerity, and national responsibi-
lity on one hand and the logic of 
shared responsibility and solidari-
ty on the other hand. To capture 
respondents’ feelings toward this 
issue, they were asked about their 
attitudes on “if and how financial 
support should be given to in-
debted countries in severe finan-
cial difficulties” and to indicate 
“who is to blame for the economic 
crisis.” As was done for the mass 
survey, the six possible options in-
cluded in the question were grou-
ped into three macro-options: 
1) a solidaristic option, i.e. readi-
ness to provide financial support 
to member states in difficulty; 
2) a conditionality option, i.e. es-
sentially the status quo whereby 
financial assistance is conditional 
on an adjustment program agreed 
with the Troika; 
3) a self-help option, the idea that 
each member state should be re-
sponsible for its own financial sta-
bility.
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Figure 3.
Financial help to weaker member states by country.
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Note: Wording of the question: “During the crisis, a number of Member States in severe economic and financial conditions have 
asked for help from the EU. This has led to the adoption of new common rules on the provision of financial support to heavily in-
debted countries. Please indicate which of these statements comes closest to your view. Financial support from the EU should… 1) 
…be granted without conditions, in the name of solidarity between EU citizens and states; 2) ...take the form of soft loans because 
all Europeans are in the same boat; 3) …be accompanied by precise conditions for repayment and domestic policy reform so as not 
to put the Monetary Union at risk; 4) …be offered voluntarily only by those countries that consider it to be in their national interest; 5) 
…not be provided because Member States should take responsibility for their own problems instead of asking money from foreign 
taxpayers; 6) …not be a task for the EU to deal with.”
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Cross-national solidarity: 
creditor vs. debtor countries4.2
A
t the aggregate level and 
in all the countries apart 
from Italy, conditionality 
gains the majority (or plu-
rality) of preferences. This is par-
ticularly true in France, Germany, 
Sweden, and Spain. Compared 
to mass opinions, political elites 
express a higher propensity to 
support the conditionality regime 
and a lower preference for both 
solidarity and self-help. 
Only in Italy are most MPs in fa-
vour of solidarity, and this support 
is higher among elites than in the 
public opinion. A relevant share 
of Polish, Swedish, and German 
MPs support national responsibili-
ty. The figure shows a rather huge 
mass-elite difference in the share 
of support for self-help in France 
(probably due to the low response 
rate of the FN MPs in our sample).
I
n terms of partisan affiliation, 
there is very large support for 
conditionality among main-
stream parties (including the 
Social-Democrats with 54%). As 
expected, MPs affiliated with left-
of-centre parties display a higher 
support for solidarity as opposed 
to national responsibility, which is 
preferred by the majority of radical 
right MPs.
Figure 4.
Financial help to weaker member states by party 
affiliation.
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Figure 5.
Who is to blame for the crisis by country.
Who is to blame for the crisis?
100
%
 o
f r
es
po
nd
en
ts
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Mass Elite Mass Elite Mass Elite Mass Elite Mass Elite Mass Elite Mass Elite Mass Elite
France Germany Italy Poland Spain Sweden UK Aggregate
EU Institutions Wealthiest EU states Most indebted EU states Banks and finance Other
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do you hold as the most responsible? 1) The institutions of the EU; 2) the wealthiest EU member states; 3) the most indebted EU 
member states; 4) banks and financial institutions; 5) other.”
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A
t the aggregate level, the-
re seem to be very simi-
lar preferences between 
voters and political elites: 
a plurality of MPs in our sample 
blame banks and financial institu-
tions for the crisis (39%) followed 
by most indebted EU member 
states (22.6%) and EU institutions 
than 25% of Italian MPs and more 
than 36% of British MPs attribute 
major responsibilities to EU institu-
tions for the EU crisis. The plura-
lity of German and Swedish MPs 
tend instead to blame the most in-
debted member states. This sha-
re is higher among the elites than 
among voters.
(18.6%). Only 8% of them blame 
the wealthiest member states. If 
we look at cross-country diffe-
rences in France, Poland, and 
especially Spain (due to the crisis 
of the credit sector), the plurality 
of the interviewed MPs blames 
banks and financial institutions 
for the current EU crisis. More 
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Figure 6.
Who is to blame for the crisis by party affiliation.
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M
Ps indirectly associated 
with the Left & Greens 
and the Social-Demo-
crats tend to attribute 
major responsibility for the crisis 
to banks and financial institutions, 
while the Liberals and Populars 
tend to blame the most indebted 
EU member states. Right wingers 
mainly blame EU institutions.
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Figure 7.
Access to domestic labour markets by country.
How should European workers access domestic labour market?
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Note: Wording of the question: “According to EU law, EU citizens are allowed to work in every Member State. How do you think EU 
citizens of other nationalities that come to work in our country should access the labour market? 1) Freely and individually, just like my 
national fellows; 2) As guest workers and only as long as they keep the job that let them in [COUNTRY]; 3) [NATIONALITY] workers 
should have priority access to jobs and employment services.”
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Opening vs. closure: free movement 
and foreigners’ access to domestic 
labour market and welfare
4.3
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Figure 8.
Access to domestic labour markets by party 
affiliation.
How should European workers access domestic labour market?
100
%
 o
f r
es
po
nd
en
ts
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Left & 
Greens S&D Liberals EPP
Radical
right
En 
Marche
Freely and individually Guest workers Priority to nationals
97,6
89 92
79,3
40,9
90,5
2,4 0,6
10,4
8 5,5
15,2
32,4
26,7
9,5
A
t the aggregate level, 
there is huge support 
(79.5%) for free mo-
vement and access 
to domestic labour markets by 
workers coming from other EU 
member states. No substantial 
cross-country differences among 
political elites are noticeable. Elite 
attitudes on this front seem much 
more open than those of voters. 
This is true especially in France, 
where the electoral system has gi-
ven a disproportionate number of 
seats to Macron’s party, La Repu-
blique en Marche, in the last vo-
ting round.
Table 2.
Access to domestic labour markets by political 
orientation and background features of MPs.
Freely and
individually
Guest
workers
Priority to
nationals N
L-R self-placement
Left 95,5% 4,3% 0,2% 132 100%
Centre 77,7% 12,9% 9,4% 150 100%
Right 51,4% 29% 19,6% 82 100%
Affiliation to think tank
Not affiliated 72,5% 16,1% 11,5% 328 100%
Affiliated 85,8% 9,6% 4,6% 98 100%
University degree
No degree 69,5% 13,9% 16,7% 97 100%
Degree 79% 14,5% 6,5% 254 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
T
he support for free move-
ment is very high among 
all party groupings except 
for the radical right, which 
is more inclined toward a “guest 
worker” regime or to giving priority 
to national workers in accessing 
domestic labour markets. 
T
he table shows a clear 
inverse linear relationship 
between ideological pre-
ferences (L-R scale) and 
support for free movement. MPs 
affiliated with think tanks tend to 
support free movement of wor-
kers more than MPs who have no 
links with think tanks. MPs without 
a university degree tend to prefer 
exclusionary measures.
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Figure 9.
Access to welfare benefits by country.
Who should access national welfare?
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Note: Wording of the question: “Which of these three statements on the access to social security benefits by citizens of other EU 
Member States comes closest to your own point of view? 1) All foreigners legally resident in [COUNTRY] should have the same social 
security benefits as the [NATIONALITY]; 2) Only nationals of other EU Member States, legally resident in [COUNTRY] should have the 
same social security benefits as the [NATIONALITY]; 3) A foreigner, even if legally resident in [COUNTRY], should not have the same 
social security benefits as the [NATIONALITY].
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A
t the aggregate level, 
most interviewed MPs 
(53%) support cross-bor-
ders welfare rights. As in 
the case of access to domestic 
labour markets, support is higher 
among political elites than among 
voters. Cross-country differences 
among elites are, however, more 
pronounced in this case. A notice-
able share of chauvinist attitudes 
is present among German, Swe-
dish, and British MPs. In Poland 
(and partly also in France), there 
is a preference for the “only EU” 
option.
Figure 10.
Access to welfare benefits by party affiliation.
Who should access national welfare?
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T
he table confirms that the-
re is a significant differen-
ce between Left & Greens 
and Social-democrats on 
one hand and Liberals, Populars, 
and the radical right partisans on 
the other hand. En Marche MPs in 
this case side with the Left in being 
more supportive to opening. Po-
pulars show a strong propensity 
toward limiting access only to EU 
citizens, while the Liberals seem 
polarised between full and restri-
ctive opening. Right wing MPs are 
in turn polarised between restricti-
ve and exclusionary measures.
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Table 3.
Access to welfare benefits by ideological 
leanings and previous occupation of MPs.
Freely and
individually
Guest
workers
Priority to
nationals N
L-R self-placement
Left 78,6% 19,5% 1,9% 143 100%
Centre 46,7% 42% 11,3% 153 100%
Right 19,3% 51,7% 29% 90 100%
Job in public sector
Private 41,6% 40,4% 18% 178 100%
Public 56% 33,8% 10,2% 177 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
Figure 11.
The benefits of membership by country.
Has your country benefited from the membership in the EU?
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Note: Wording of the question: “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [COUNTRY] has on balance benefited or 
not from being a member of the European Union? 1) It has benefited; 2) It has not benefited.”
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I
n the pooled sample, more than 
eight MPs over 10 believe that 
their country has overall benefi-
ted from EU membership. High 
levels of EU support are noticeable 
in France, Germany, Poland, and 
Sweden. By contrast, almost one 
MP out of four in Italy and Swe-
den believes that their country in 
general has not benefited from EU 
membership. This share reaches 
40% in the UK. Since this que-
stion was not included in the RE-
ScEU Mass survey conducted at 
the end of 2016, we have compa-
red elites’ support for the EU with 
public attitudes gathered from the 
answers they gave to the very 
The powers of Brussels: 
supranational integration vs. 
national sovereignty
4.4
Figure 12.
The benefits of membership: longitudinal trend.
Benefit of the EU membership: longitudinal trend
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T
he same question was 
also included in the two 
waves of the elite survey 
conducted in 2007 and 
2009 in the framework of the In-
Tune research project (Best et al. 
2012). Although we could rely only 
on three time points, this allowed 
us to make a comparison of po-
litical elites’ attitudes toward their 
country membership in the EU be-
fore and after the Eurozone crisis. 
In five out of six countries included 
in both InTune and REScEU sam-
ples (Sweden was not sampled in 
InTune, while Spain does not pre-
same question administered in 
the Eurobarometer 88.1 (October 
2017). Interestingly, in the pooled 
sample, as well as in six countries 
out of seven, the general public 
tends to be more sceptical about 
the benefits their country received 
from being a member of the EU 
than political elites. Mass-elite dif-
ferences are particularly evident in 
Spain (19.4 points), France (23.6 
points), and above all in Italy (31 
points). Although Italian elites are 
among the most Eurosceptic (not 
benefited = 23.8%) in our sam-
ple, an impressive 54.8% of the 
sampled citizens do not support 
the EU. The UK instead is the only 
country in which diffuse support 
for the EU is lower among natio-
nal representatives (59.5%) than 
among citizens (66.7%).
Figure 13.
The benefits of membership by party affiliation.
Has your country benefited from the membership in the EU?
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sent a relevant change over time), 
the share of MPs’ general support 
for the EU slightly rose between 
2007 and 2009 and then decrea-
sed after the outbreak of the Euro-
zone crisis in 2017-2018. The fall 
in EU support by national repre-
sentatives is particularly evident in 
Poland (-8 points), Italy (-21.2 poin-
ts), and the UK (-31.4 points). It is 
worth noting that, while during the 
administration of the survey British 
and Polish parliaments presented 
a conservative and Eurosceptic 
majority, in the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies (2013-2018), centre-left 
parties had the majority of seats.
F
igure 13 shows a very 
positive evaluation of EU 
membership among Left 
& Greens as well as main-
stream parties (Social-democrats, 
Liberals, and Populars). Most MPs 
belonging to right-wing parties 
expressed a negative evaluation. 
Compared to previous conflicts, 
in investigating MPs’ opinions on 
the vertical divide contrasting su-
pranational integration versus na-
tional sovereignty, country-level 
differences are less evident while 
individual level factors are more 
relevant. 
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A
s Table 4 shows, evalua-
tions regarding EU mem-
bership tend to be more 
positive according to 
some background characteristics 
of MPs:
•   MPs with left-leaning preferen-
ces are more positive toward the 
EU than MPs with centre and ri-
ght-leaning preferences;
•   MPs affiliated with think tanks 
are more positive compared to 
those non-affiliated;
•   Senior MPs (on more than one 
legislature) are more positive com-
pared to newcomers;
•   Older MPs (50 years or older) 
are more positive compared to 
younger ones;
•   MPs who have a university de-
gree are more positive compared 
to less-educated ones;
•   MPs who were employed in the 
public sector before entering the 
parliament are more positive com-
pared to those employed in the 
private sector.
Table 4.
Access to welfare benefits by ideological 
leanings and socio-demographics of MPs.
Not
benefited Benefited N
L-R self-placement
Left 9,4% 90,6% 142 100%
Centre 17% 83% 154 100%
Right 37,6% 62,4% 90 100%
Affiliation to think tank
Not affiliated 24% 76% 283 100%
Affiliated 10% 90% 105 100%
Seniority
Senior 15,4% 84,6% 182 100%
Newcomer 25% 75% 207 100%
Age
25-49 25,4% 74,6% 141 100%
50+ 17,8% 82,2% 248 100%
Education
No university degree 36,2% 63,8% 106 100%
University degree 15,2% 82,2% 266 100%
Job in public sector
Private 28,9% 71,1% 177 100%
Public 11% 89% 179 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
Figure 14.
EUpolitanism and evaluation of EU membership.
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I
n the analysis of REScEU’s 
mass survey we investigated 
the association between “EU-
politanism,” which refers to the 
degree of experience and/or fami-
liarity with EU member states dif-
ferent from the respondent’s and 
attitudes toward EU integration 
and solidarity. We have also con-
structed a similar index for elites 
aiming to capture the international 
profile and networking of national 
representatives.4 As can be seen 
by the bar chart plotted in Figure 
14, the association between EU-
politanism and a positive evalua-
tion of EU membership is strong 
and significant. MPs who believe 
that their country has benefited 
from EU membership tend to pre-
sent higher EUpolitanism scores.
4 EUpolitanism is an additive index based on five survey items: 1) Has the respondent ever studied or worked in another EU country? 
2) How often does the respondent inform him/herself through media from countries other than his/her own (response categories: 
every day; once in a week; from time to time; never). 3-5) Has the respondent had contacts during the last year with 3) European 
interest groups, 4) social movements and NGOs, or 5) parties of other EU countries. Answers are coded through a Likert scale who-
se categories are: “Yes, at least once a week,” “Yes, at least once a month,” “Yes, at least once every three months,” “Yes, at least 
once a year,” or “No contacts last year.” Cronbach alpha equals 0.73, indicating that the EUpolitanism index has a satisfactory level 
of internal consistency
29
A
t the aggregate level, sli-
ghtly less than 40% of 
MPs support the idea 
of the EU as a common 
house for all European citizens. 
This image is followed by the 
apartment building (28.4%), the 
playing ground (21.5%), and the 
sinking ship (11.3%).
Figure 15.
The image of the EU by country.
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Note: Wording of the question: “In talking about the European Union, media and people sometimes use the following images. 
Could you please indicate which one comes closest to your view? 1) The EU is the common house of all European citizens; 2) The 
EU is like an apartment building: national people live next to each other like good neighbours; 3) The EU is a playing ground that 
facilitates (mutually advantageous) economic exchanges among Member States and citizens; 4) The EU is a sinking ship: member 
States should escape it as fast as they can.”
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S
upport for the image of 
the EU as a common 
house is higher among 
political elites than among 
citizens. Cross-country differen-
ces among MPs are in line with 
differences among voters; support 
for the “common house” image is 
majoritarian among French, Italian, 
and Spanish MPs. More than 70% 
of German MPs opt for the idea of 
the EU as an apartment building. 
High levels of support for this po-
sition are also found in Poland. 
The majority of Swedish MPs pre-
fers the idea of the EU as a playing 
ground. Finally, more than 43% of 
British MPs considers the EU as a 
sinking ship that should be aban-
doned as soon as possible.
30
Common house Apartment building Playing ground Sinking ship
Figure 16.
The image of the EU by partisan affiliation.
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Table 5.
The image of the EU by ideological leanings and by individual features of 
MPs
Common 
house
Apartment
building
Playing
ground
Sinking
ship N
L-R self-placement
Left 51,2% 30,9% 10,4% 7,5% 142 100%
Centre 38,5% 35,7% 17,4% 8,4% 153 100%
Right 15,3% 28,7% 21,8% 34,2% 90 100%
Trade union membership
Not a member 41,7% 28,7% 15% 14,6% 195 100%
Member 28,2% 37,7% 17,2% 16,9% 182 100%
Education
No university 20,8% 31,7% 22,5% 25% 106 100%
University 41,6% 32,8% 12,8% 12,8% 266 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 test.
T
he image of the EU as a 
common house is sup-
ported especially by main-
stream parties (Social-de-
mocrats, Liberals, and Populars). 
44% of Left & Greens MPs prefer 
the idea of an apartment building 
in which national  people  live  next 
to  each  other  like  good  nei-
ghbours. 45% of right-wing MPs 
instead consider the EU as a sin-
king ship.
T
he idea of the EU as a 
common house for all Eu-
ropean citizens finds hi-
gher support among: 
•   MPs who place themselves on 
the left side of the L-R scale, com-
pared to those located in the cen-
tre or the right;
•   MPs who are members of tra-
de unions compared to those who 
are not members;
•   MPs who have a university de-
gree compared to less-educated 
ones.
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Policies for a more 
social Europe5
Figure 17.
Support for policies fostering pan-European solidarity (basic assistance) 
by country
Financial help to states to support anyone without basic means of subsistence
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Note: Wording of the question: “EU Member States have decided that their economic and social policies should be brought closer 
together. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: In case of a very severe financial crisis in a 
given Member State, the EU should make sure that no citizen of that state remains without means of subsistence (food, shelter, es-
sential medicines, etc...) 1) Strongly agree; 2) Somewhat agree; 3) Somewhat disagree 4) Strongly disagree ” Agree = (1)+(2); Disagree 
= (3)+(4).
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T
he 2016 REScEU Mass 
Survey included several 
questions aimed at cap-
turing potential support 
for strengthening the EU social di-
mension through specific measu-
res dealing with the fight against 
poverty and unemployment, eco-
nomic and social investments, 
and migration. We repeated such 
questions for the elite survey as 
well. Some of the policy proposals 
evoked by our questions have al-
ready entered the public debate 
within the wider discussion on the 
idea of establishing a fully-fledged 
European Social Union.
A
t the aggregate level, 
our data show very lar-
ge support (more than 
80%) in favour of provi-
ding financial help to make anyo-
ne without basic means of sub-
sistence among both voters and 
MPs. However, at the elite level, 
we note several cross-country 
differences that mass survey 
data do not show. Large groups 
of Swedish (52.1%), German 
(33.6%), and Polish (21.2%) MPs 
are not in favour of such policy 
proposal. In the Swedish sample, 
most MPs do not support this ini-
tiative. By contrast, we note high 
support in France and especially 
in Italy and Spain, where the en-
tire sample of respondents sup-
ports this measure.
T
here are high levels of 
support for this kind of 
measure among Left & 
Greens and Social-de-
mocrats. Among Liberals, Popu-
lars, and right-wing party mem-
bers, the share of MPs who do 
not support this measure ranges 
from 20% to 30%.
Figure 18.
Support for policies fostering pan-European
solidarity (basic assistance) by partisan affiliation.
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Table 6.
Support for policies fostering pan-European 
solidarity (basic assistance) by individual features 
of MPs.
Disagree Agree N
L-R self-placement
Left 2,1% 97,9% 134 100%
Centre 19,6% 80,4% 150 100%
Right 26,5% 73,5% 83 100%
Affiliation to think tank
Not Affiliated 19,1% 80,9% 335 100%
Affiliated 8,1% 91,9% 98 100%
Education
Ordinary member 18,4% 81,6% 336 100%
Parliamentary role 7,4% 92,6% 68 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
T
o help anyone without 
basic means of subsisten-
ce is significantly higher 
among:
•   MPs with left wing orientations 
compared to those with centre 
and right-wing leanings;
•   MPs affiliated with think tanks 
compared to those not affiliated;
•   MPs with a role in the assembly 
or in a commission compared to 
ordinary members.
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O
pposition to EU-wide 
solidarity is more evi-
dent if we analyse MPs’ 
readiness to introduce 
financial help to states that face 
a sudden rise in unemployment. 
40.5% of MPs in our aggregate 
sample are not in favour of this 
measure compared to 22% of 
Figure 19.
Support for policies fostering pan-European solidarity (unemployment)
by country.
Financial help to states that face a rise unemployment
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Note: Wording of the question: “EU Member States have decided that their economic and social policies should be brought closer 
together. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: The EU should equip itself with a budget large 
enough to provide substantial financial help to Member States facing a sudden rise in unemployment rates 1) Strongly agree; 2) So-
mewhat agree; 3) Somewhat disagree 4) Strongly disagree ” Agree = (1)+(2); Disagree = (3)+(4).
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voters. Cross-country differen-
ces are evident. Most German 
and Swedish MPs disagree with 
this proposal. Also, 40% of Fren-
ch MPs and 49% of Polish MPs 
are not in favour of this measure. 
By contrast, in Italy and Spain, 
about 90% of the MPs support 
this initiative.
35
Table 7.
Support for policies fostering pan-European
solidarity (unemployment) by ideology
Disagree Agree N
L-R self-placement
Left 12,9% 87,4% 134 100%
Centre 39,9% 60,1% 150 100%
Right 63,6% 36,4% 83 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
Figure 20.
Support for policies fostering pan-European 
solidarity (unemployment) by party affiliation.
Financial help to states that face a rise unemployment
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T
he opposition to financial 
help to states that face 
a sudden rise in unem-
ployment is particularly 
evident among Liberals and Po-
pulars. About a quarter of MPs 
from the Radical Right and La 
Republique en Marche oppose 
the measure as well. Support 
is higher among the Socialists 
and Democrats and especially 
among the left-of-centre MPs. 
This result is also confirmed by 
the association between elite 
support for financial help to sta-
tes that face a sudden rise in 
unemployment and their politi-
cal orientations on the traditio-
nal left-right dimension. Support 
for this policy is particularly high 
among left-wing MPs and de-
creases moving toward the right 
pole of the scale.
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Figure 21.
Support for the introduction of Eurobonds by country.
The introduction of Eurobond
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Note: Wording of the question: “Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you indicate whether you are in 
favour or against the following: The introduction of European bonds (a.k.a. Eurobonds) 1) Strongly in favour; 2) Somewhat in favour; 
3) Somewhat against 4) Strongly against” In favour = (1)+(2); Not in favour = (3)+(4).
51,7
62,7 65,9
27,7
11,1 43,6
57,9
21,5
44,1
70,1
78,7
10,9
40
10,9
48,3
37,3 34,1
72,3
88,9
56,4
42,1
78,5
55,9
29,9 21,3
89,1
60
89,1
S
upport for Eurobonds 
shows interesting va-
riations. In general, six 
MPs out of ten in our 
pooled sample are in favour of 
the introduction of Eurobonds, a 
figure slightly higher than what is 
observed among voters (56%). 
However, in Germany, Poland, 
and Sweden, a clear majority of 
MPs (70% on average) does not 
support the introduction of Euro-
bonds. In these countries, espe-
cially Poland and Sweden, oppo-
sition is higher among elites than 
among voters. In France, Italy, 
and Spain, MPs tend to be more 
in favour of Eurobonds than vo-
ters. This difference is particular-
ly pronounced in France, mainly 
due to the overrepresentation in 
Parliament of La Republique en 
Marche as a consequence of the 
electoral system.
Pan-European solidarity: 
mutualisation of risks5.2
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Figure 22.
Support for the introduction of Eurobonds by 
party affiliation.
The introduction of Eurobond
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F
igure 22 shows the usual 
strong association betwe-
en opinions on the intro-
duction of Eurobonds and 
partisan affiliation. Three MPs 
out of four among those who be-
long to a radical right party are 
against the introduction of Euro-
bonds. The issue is highly con-
tentious also among Populars 
whose sample is split down the 
middle. While 40% of Liberals 
are against the Eurobonds, more 
than 90% of the MPs belonging 
to La Republique en Marche are 
in favour of their introduction. 
Interestingly, the opposition to 
Eurobonds is higher among left-
wing and green MPs (26%) than 
among Social-democrats (13%).
Table 8.
Support for policies fostering pan-European 
solidarity (unemployment) by individual features
of MPs.
Not in favour In favour N
L-R self-placement
Left 17,9% 82,1% 134 100%
Centre 39,8% 60,2% 150 100%
Right 64,5% 35,5% 83 100%
Affiliation to interest Group
Not affiliated 36,7% 63,3% 309 100%
Affiliated 66,9% 33,1% 46 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
S
upport for the intro-
duction of Eurobonds 
is significantly higher 
among:
•   MPs with left wing orienta-
tions compared to those with 
right-wing leanings and those lo-
cated in the centre;
•   MPs not affiliated with interest 
groups or consulting agencies 
compared to those affiliated.
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Figure 23.
Support for policies fostering pan-European solidarity (Migration Fund) 
by country.
EU fund compensating member states for costs of intra-EU migration
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Note: Wording of the question: “Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you indicate whether you are in 
favour or against the following: The introduction of a common EU fund compensating national governments and local communities 
for the costs related to immigration from other EU Member States. 1) Strongly in favour; 2) Somewhat in favour; 3) Somewhat against 
4) Strongly against” In favour = (1)+(2); Not in favour = (3)+(4)
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Pan-European solidarity: 
Support for mobility and immigration5.3
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Figure 24.
Support for policies fostering pan-European 
solidarity (Migration Fund) by partisan affiliation.
EU fund compensating member states 
for costs of intra-EU migration
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A
t the aggregate level, 
MPs are in favour of an 
EU fund compensating 
member states and lo-
cal communities for the costs of 
intra-EU migration. There are, 
however, notable differences at 
the country level. Support is hi-
gher among French, Italian, and 
Spanish MPs but lower in Ger-
many, Poland, and Sweden. In 
these three countries, opposition 
is higher among elites than vo-
ters. In Poland, more than 50% 
of respondents are against this 
fund.
I
n this case, there is a strong 
linear relationship between 
support for an EU fund com-
pensating member states and 
local communities for the costs 
related to immigration and par-
tisan affiliation/ideological lea-
nings. Moving from left to right, 
the share of MPs against this 
fund increases. Only among ri-
ght-wing parties are most MPs 
against this fund. Furthermore, 
support for this fund is higher 
among MPs affiliated with think 
tanks compared to those who 
are not affiliated (see Table 9).
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Table 9.
Support for policies fostering pan-European 
solidarity (Migration Fund) by individual features 
of the MPs.
Disagree Agree N
L-R self-placement
Left 2,1% 97,9% 134 100%
Centre 19,6% 80,4% 150 100%
Right 26,5% 73,5% 83 100%
Affiliation to think tank
Not Affiliated 19,1% 80,9% 335 100%
Affiliated 8,1% 91,9% 98 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
Figure 25.
Support for policies fostering pan-European solidarity (Migration Fund) by 
country.
A common EU social insurance scheme that covers intra-EU migrant workers
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Note: Wording of the question: “Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you indicate whether you are in 
favour or against the following: The introduction of a common EU social insurance schemes (healthcare and unemployment) that 
cover intra-EU migrant workers. 1) Strongly in favour; 2) Somewhat in favour; 3) Somewhat against 4) Strongly against” In favour = 
(1)+(2); Not in favour = (3)+(4)
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Figure 26.
Support for policies fostering pan-European
solidarity (Migration Fund) by partisan affiliation.
A common EU social insurance scheme that covers 
intra-EU migrant workers
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A
t the aggregate level, 
most MPs are in favour 
of an EU common social 
insurance scheme that 
covers intra-EU migrant wor-
kers. Support is higher among 
Spanish MPs (in line with mass 
opinions) and even more among 
Italian MPs, whose favour for this 
option is much greater than at 
the mass level. French MPs are 
also highly favourable, while the 
majority of voters are against this 
option. In Germany, a relatively 
slight majority of MPs are against 
it in contrast to a large majority 
of voters who would support the 
fund. The gap between voters 
(favourable) and MPS (contrary) 
is even higher in Poland and 
Sweden, where an impressive 
86% of the sample opposes the 
EU social insurance scheme for 
intra-EU migrant workers.
W
e can observe the 
familiar strong as-
sociation between 
support for a com-
mon social insurance scheme 
and partisan affiliation/ideolo-
gical leanings. Moving from left 
to right on the ideological scale, 
the share of favourable MPs de-
clines. MPs belonging to a party 
affiliated with the EPP are highly 
polarised, but the slight majority 
is in favour of this measure. Only 
among right-wing parties is the 
majority against this fund.
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Table 10.
Support for policies fostering pan-European 
solidarity (Migration Fund) by individual features 
of the MPs.
Disagree Agree N
L-R self-placement
Left 6,1% 93,9% 134 100%
Centre 35,5% 64,5% 150 100%
Right 66,2% 33,8% 83 100%
Affiliation to interest group
Not Affiliated 32,1% 67,9% 312 100%
Affiliated 60,5% 39,5% 46 100%
Note: All the associations reported in the table are significant according to the Chi2 
test.
S
upport for the proposal 
of establishing an insu-
rance scheme is higher 
among MPs not affiliated 
to interest groups compared to 
those affiliated
Figure 27.
Who should decide on extra-EU immigration by country.
Decisions on extra-EU migration should be taken in Brussels
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Note: Wording of the question: “EU Member States have decided that their economic and social policies should be brought closer 
together. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: Decisions about controls at the EU external 
border and about the status of extra-EU immigrants and refugees should be made in Brussels. 1) Strongly agree; 2) Somewhat agree; 
3) Somewhat disagree 4) Strongly disagree ” Agree = (1)+(2); Disagree = (3)+(4).
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M
Ps of all party groupin-
gs show high levels of 
support for a grea-
ter EU involvement in 
migration issues. Only among 
radical right MPs do we find a 
majority that does not support 
this view.
T
he refugee and immigra-
tion crisis has created a 
mounting series of policy, 
social, and political pro-
blems, especially in the CCEC 
countries and the Southern 
countries. A fierce debate has 
emerged on the merits/demeri-
ts of the institutional status quo 
(the Dublin regulation) and its di-
stributional consequences. Such 
a debate has also addressed the 
thorny issue about who should 
decide (and thus take respon-
sibility) for choices and policies 
related to extra-EU immigration. 
F
igure 27 shows that at 
the aggregate level, more 
than three out of four MPs 
agree with the statement 
that decisions on extra-EU immi-
grants should be made in Brus-
sels. This percentage is higher 
than what was observed at the 
mass level. Cross-country diffe-
rences are not really pronounced 
at the elite level. In all six coun-
tries, the majority of MPs agree 
with shifting responsibility to the 
EU level. Lower support is noti-
ceable among Polish and Swe-
dish MPs.
Figure 28.
Who should decide on extra-EU immigration
by partisan affiliation.
Decisions on extra-EU migration should be taken in Brussels
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Figure 29.
The nature of the crisis by country.
The nature of the crisis
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Note: Wording of the question: “Some commentators argue that the EU is currently experiencing a major political crisis, along with 
an economic one. Could you please indicate which of the following statements comes closest to your view? 1) The EU is experiencing 
an economic crisis that is also producing political discontent areas among certain social groups; 2) The EU is experiencing both an 
economic and a political crisis with distinct causes and effects; 3) The EU’s long-standing political crisis has hampered its ability to 
respond to the financial crisis of 2008.
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T
his section explores the 
views of MPs on the 
post-2008 crisis: its na-
ture, consequences, the 
way in which the crisis was ma-
naged by leaders, and the role 
of the biggest member state, i.e. 
Germany. Such questions were 
not included in the mass survey, 
given their degree of complexity.
The nature of the crisis 
and the behaviour of 
EU member states and 
leaders
6
Figure 30.
The nature of the crisis by party affiliation.
The nature of the crisis
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A
t the aggregate level, 
the majority of MPs 
believe that the nature 
of the post-2008 crisis 
is both political and economic. 
33% of them believe it is mostly 
political while another 24% think 
it is essentially an economic cri-
sis. Cross-country differences 
are not very pronounced. In all 
seven countries included in the 
survey, most respondents agree 
on the political-economic natu-
re of the crisis. In Italy, 42% of 
MPs emphasise the political di-
mension, while in Spain, 34.8% 
emphasise the economic dimen-
sions. There seems to be very 
little difference across parties. 
Irrespective of their party affilia-
tion, most MPs believe that the 
nature of the crisis is both politi-
cal and economic.
Figure 31.
Which solution for the current EU crisis by country
The nature of the crisis
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Note: Wording of the question: “In your opinion, what should the EU do to alleviate the effects of the current crisis? 1) Nothing. Poli-
tical discontent will disappear once the economy recovers and living standards rise again; 2) The EU should address its long-standing 
democratic deficit, with the EU becoming more similar to a parliamentary system; 3) The EU should adopt stricter rules on financial 
speculation and international economic transactions; 4) The EU should move towards a full political and fiscal union; 5) The EU should 
limit cooperation to a few core areas. Member states which have an interest in closer integration should make specific agreements 
among themselves; 6) The EU project should just be abandoned. National democracy and sovereignty should be reaffirmed.
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Figure 32.
Which solution for the current EU crisis by party 
affiliation.
Which solution for the current EU crisis
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I
f we move from the nature of 
the crisis to the possible solu-
tions, interesting cross-country 
and cross-partisan differences 
emerge. The majority of French, 
Italian, and Spanish responden-
ts believe that full political and 
fiscal integration might help the 
EU to overcome the crisis. The 
plurality of German and British 
respondents and the majority of 
Swedish MPs believe that a pos-
sible solution might be less inte-
gration (a “two-speed Europe”). 
20% of British MPs are in favour 
of abandoning the EU altogether. 
The plurality of Polish respon-
dents emphasises instead the 
democratic deficit issue. At the 
partisan level, more than 38% of 
left-wing and green MPs would 
favour imposing stricter rules on 
financial speculation and inter-
national economic transactions. 
The plurality of Social-democrats 
and Liberals opts for a full politi-
cal and fiscal union. Populars are 
highly polarised; 41% of them 
favours less integration while on 
the opposite another 37% is for 
full integration. 40% of right-wing 
MPs want less integration, while 
24% want to exit the EU.
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Figure 33.
Views on the behaviour of Germany by country.
Opinion on the role of Germany and the 
own country during the crisis
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Note: Wording of the questions: “Using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 indi-
cates “a self-interested hegemon” and 10 indicates “a solidaristic leader,” how would 
you describe Germany’s political and diplomatic behaviour during the Euro crisis? By 
and large, Germany behaved as…” / “Using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 
indicates “a self-interested actor” and 10 indicates “a solidaristic actor,” how would you 
describe our country’s political and diplomatic behaviour during the Euro crisis? By and 
large, [OUR COUNTRY] behaved as…”
I
t cannot be denied that Ger-
many, as the largest member 
state and the biggest eco-
nomy in the EU, has played 
a key role during the crisis. The 
graph plotted in Figure 33 di-
splays on the X-axis the average 
MP’s opinion on the behaviour of 
Germany during the crisis on a 
0-10 scale with 0 meaning “the 
behaviour of a self-interested 
hegemon” and 10 meaning “the 
behaviour of a solidaristic lea-
der.” On the Y-axis, the graph di-
splays the average MP’s evalua-
tion about the behaviour of their 
country during the crisis on the 
same 0-10 scale.
W
e plotted the seven 
countries according 
to their MPs’ ave-
rage scores on the-
se two scales. The MPs of our 
aggregate seven country sam-
ple tend to express a negative 
judgement of the role played by 
Germany during the crisis (ove-
rall average score 4.4), but they 
have a moderately positive opi-
nion about their own country 
(overall average score 5.5). This 
combined judgement (negati-
ve for Germany and positive for 
their own country) is quite clear 
among the MPs of France, Po-
land, Spain, and especially Italy 
(upper-left quadrant). By con-
trast, German MPs have a posi-
tive opinion of the role played by 
their country (overall score 5.7). 
Swedish MPs are particularly sa-
tisfied with both Germany’s (6.6) 
and Sweden’s (7) behaviour. Bri-
tish MPs have a negative view 
of both Germany and the UK 
(lower-left quadrant).
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Figure 34.
Views on the behaviour of Germany by party
affiliation.
Opinion on the role of Germany and the 
own country during the crisis
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I
n Figure 34, the MPs’ avera-
ge scores on the two scales 
illustrated above are plotted 
according to their partisan af-
filiation. What is immediately no-
ticeable is that there are more 
differences among parties than 
among countries. MPs affiliated 
with the EPP, the Liberals and 
La Republique en Marche have 
a positive opinion on both Ger-
many’s and their own country’s 
behaviour (upper-right quadrant). 
The average scores given by so-
cial-democratic MPs are very 
close to the middle of both sca-
les. Radical right MPs express a 
very negative judgement of the 
role of Germany (2.9) but a posi-
tive opinion of their own country 
(5.7) (upper-left quadrant). Left-
wing and Green MPs have a very 
negative view of both Germany’s 
(3.2) and their own country’s role 
(2.4) (lower-left quadrant). F
igure 35 plots the average 
scores of MPs from each 
country by self-placement 
on the 0-10 L-R scale 
(X-axis with 0 meaning extreme 
left and 10 meaning extreme ri-
ght) and by their views on the 
behaviour of Germany (Y axis). In 
countries where the MPs’ avera-
ge score tends toward the left, 
we also observe a more negati-
ve evaluation of Germany. At the 
time of our survey, Italy had the 
most leftist parliament and the 
most negative view of Germany’s 
role. By contrast, Sweden had 
the second most right-leaning 
parliament and the most positive 
evaluation of Germany. Poland 
stands out as an exception. It 
had a right-wing parliament but a 
negative judgement of Germany. 
The correlation between left-ri-
ght self-placement and MPs’ 
opinions on the behaviour of 
Germany is rather high (r=0.26).
Figure 35.
Views on the behaviour of Germany by L-R 
self-placement.
Opinion on the role of Germany during the crisis
by L-R self-placement
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T
he second most right-le-
aning parliament and the 
most positive evalua-
tion of Germany. Poland 
stands out as an exception. It 
had a right-wing parliament but a 
negative judgement of Germany. 
The correlation between left-ri-
ght self-placement and MPs’ 
opinions on the behaviour of 
Germany is rather high (r=0.26).
I
n the graph above, we plotted 
the average scores of coun-
tries on the 0-12 EUpolitanism 
scale (X-axis), with 0 represen-
ting a low EUpolitan profile and 
10 representing a high EUpolitan 
profile, and the 0-10 scale about 
the judgement of Germany. We 
detected a positive and signifi-
cant, although not particularly 
Figure 36.
Views on the behaviour of Germany by 
EUpolitanism
Opinion on the role of Germany during the crisis
by EUpolitanism
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strong, association between EU-
politanism and MPs’ judgement 
of Germany’s behaviour during 
the crisis (r=0.19). Swedish and 
German MPs show the highest 
EUpolitanism score and the most 
positive judgement of Germany’s 
role during the crisis. Polish and 
Italian MPs present the opposite 
pattern.
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W
hile the behaviour 
of Germany during 
the recent crisis is 
not always positively 
judged, the MPs in our aggre-
gate sample tend to like Angela 
Merkel. In all countries except for 
the UK, MPs rate Angela Merkel 
with a score higher than 5 on 
a 0-10 scale on average, whe-
re 0 means strongly dislike and 
10 means strongly like. In Fran-
Figure 37.
Views on various EU leaders by country.
Opinion on European leaders
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Note: Wording of the question: “Using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how 
do you feel about the following political leaders? Jean-Claude Juncker / Angela Merkel / Alexis Tsipras / Theresa May / Viktor Orbán.”
ce, Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
Sweden, the German Chancel-
lor is the most preferred leader 
among those included in the 
questionnaire. In Poland, Merkel 
is slightly overcome by Theresa 
May and Viktor Orbán. Orbán 
received very low scores in all 
the other countries. Tsipras re-
ceived better evaluations in Italy 
and the UK compared to other 
countries, but in none of the 
sample countries did he receive 
a score higher than 5. The eva-
luation of the European Commis-
sion President Juncker does not 
show significant variation across 
countries and was lowest in Po-
land and the UK. Theresa May is 
the most preferred leader among 
the British MPs followed by An-
gela Merkel.pattern.
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Figure 38.
Views on various EU leaders by party affiliation.
Opinion on European leaders
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Left &Greens S&D Liberals EPP Radical right En Marche
Junker (mean) Merkel (mean) Tsipras (mean) May (mean) Orban (mean)
E
valuations according to 
partisan affiliation reflect 
the various leaders’ par-
tisanship. Angela Merkel, 
followed by Juncker, is the most 
preferred leader among EPP, 
ALDE, La Republique en Marche, 
and S&D representatives. Among 
the latter, the German chancellor 
is followed by Tsipras. Tsipras is 
the most preferred leader among 
left-wing and green MPs. There-
sa May and Viktor Orbán are the 
most preferred European leaders 
among right-wing MPs.
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Figure 39.
Assessment of the Brexit referendum by country.
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Note: Wording of the question: “On the last 23rd of June, through a referendum, British citizens voted that the United Kingdom 
should leave the European Union. Please indicate which of these statements on the opportunity to call such a referendum comes 
closest to your view. 1) It was a right decision because any peaceful expression of the popular will should be welcomed; 2) It was a 
right decision, even though it can be risky to hold a referendum on such a complex issue; 3) It was a mistake to hold a referendum 
on such a complex issue but the British government has to respect its outcome; 4) It was a mistake to hold a referendum on such a 
complex issue and now British institutions must find a way to minimise damage from its outcome.”
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An insight into Brexit7
A
lmost two years after 
the referendum with 
which a majority of Bri-
tish voters decided that 
the United Kingdom should leave 
the EU, Brexit still represents a 
highly polarising issue for British 
public opinion and political elite 
and a thorny problem for There-
sa May’s government. The way 
in which the British government 
deals the UK withdrawal from 
the EU and sets the future UK-
EU political and economic rela-
tionship is a turning point in both 
recent British political history and 
the European integration pro-
cess.
53
T
he REScEU Elite Survey 
elaborates a largely diffe-
rent questionnaire for the 
UK aiming to tap British 
MPs’ opinions on Brexit, its po-
tential consequences, and future 
scenarios once the UK will have 
abandoned the EU. Some of the 
questions were also included in 
the 2016 REScEU Mass Survey, 
while others have been admini-
stered only to the elite.
F
irst, we asked MPs in all 
seven sample countries 
their attitudes toward the 
very decision of calling a 
referendum on Brexit. Overall, 
more than 40% of MPs inter-
viewed believes that calling a 
referendum on Brexit was a mi-
stake, and now the government 
should try to minimize the dama-
ge. This view finds greater sup-
port among political elites than 
among voters. 26% of MPs an-
swered that the referendum was 
a mistake, but the government 
should now respect the outco-
me, and 20% of them believe it 
was the right decision. The idea 
that calling a referendum on 
such a complex issue as Brexit 
was a mistake is preferred by the 
plurality or majority of MPs in all 
the sample countries apart from 
the UK. In all these countries, the 
share of MPs who negatively as-
sessed the referendum is higher 
than the share of voters expres-
sing the same view.
I
n the UK, MPs are more pola-
rised than the public opinion. 
While 40.5% of MPs believe 
that calling a referendum on 
Brexit was the right decision, 
37% of them think it was a mista-
ke, and the government should 
try to minimize the damage.
I
n all the party families, apart 
from the radical right, large 
majorities of MPs believe that 
calling a referendum on Brexit 
was a mistake. 45% to 58% of 
them believe that now the Bri-
Figure 40.
Assessment of the Brexit referendum by party
affiliation.
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tish government should try to 
minimize the damage. Among 
right-wing parties, 72% of MPs 
believe that letting the people 
decide on such an important is-
sue was the right decision.
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Figure 41.
Which concerns about the integration process 
affect the outcome of the Brexit referendum?
Which concerns about the integration process
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Note: Wording of the question: “Some people have fears about the process of Eu-
ropean unification. Please indicate whether or not you believe the following concerns 
influenced the final outcome of the “Brexit” referendum: 1) The loss of jobs and social 
security; 2) The loss of national identity and culture; 3) A growing share of national inco-
me being paid into the EU budget; 4) A weakening of national democracy.”
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I
n another question, we asked 
British MPs which concerns 
about the integration process 
most affected the outcome of 
the Brexit referendum. In gene-
ral, more than three out of four 
MPs believe that concerns about 
1) a loss of jobs and social se-
curity, 2) a loss of culture and 
national identity, 3) an increasing 
share of the national income into 
the EU budget, and 4) the we-
akening of national democracy 
as a consequence of the inte-
gration process affected voters’ 
decision to vote “Leave” in the 
Brexit referendum. MPs tend to 
be more concerned about Briti-
sh voters on all these aspects, 
especially regarding the loss of 
jobs and social security.
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A
s Figure 42 shows, whi-
le more than eight out 
of ten Conservatives 
and DUP MPs believe 
that the outcome of the referen-
dum would have been different 
if the EU institutions had made 
major concessions to Cameron’s 
government, the majority of La-
bour and SNP MPs think that the 
outcome would have been the 
same.
Figure 42.
Outcome of the referendum in case of major 
concessions by the EU by party affiliation.
Outcome of referendum in case of major concessions by the EU
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Note: Wording of the question: “Do you think that the outcome of the referendum 
would have been different, had the EU made major concessions to the UK in order to 
keep it as a Member State? 1) The outcome would have been different, had the EU 
made major concessions to the UK; 2) The outcome would have been the same regar-
dless of any concession made by the EU.”
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Figure 43.
Opinion on the consequences of Brexit 
referendum.
Consequences of Brexit referendum
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Note: Wording of the question: “Considering the outcome of the “Brexit” referendum, 
would you say the situation of the national economy in the UK over the next 12 mon-
ths will improve a lot, will improve somewhat, will get somewhat worse or will get a lot 
worse; will stay about the same / To what extent do you think that the outcome of the 
“Brexit” referendum it is a good or bad thing for the international role of the UK?”
W
hile only 27% of 
British respondents 
who participated in 
the REScEU mass 
survey believe that the national 
economic situation worsened in 
the 12 months after the referen-
dum, this percentage reached 
56% among British MPs. In the 
same way, the majority of British 
MPs believe that the internatio-
nal role of the UK worsened after 
the outcome of the referendum, 
while the mass sample is split 
down the middle.
Figure 44.
Opinion on the consequences of Brexit referendum 
on British economic situation by party affiliation.
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Figure 45.
Opinion on the consequences of Brexit referendum 
on the international role of the UK by party affiliation.
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Figure 46.
Opinion on the future UK-EU relationship by party 
affiliation.
Post-Brexit scenario 
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Free trade agreement and free movement
Free trade agreement without free movement
No agreement
Note: Wording of the question: “Some commentators suggest that the British gover-
nment may now be willing to sign a new free trade agreement with the EU. Which of the 
following statements come closest to your view? 1) The British government should ne-
gotiate a new free trade agreement with the EU, even if this means allowing EU citizens 
to freely live and work in the UK; 2) The British government should negotiate a new free 
trade agreement with the EU but only if this means not allowing EU citizens to freely live 
and work in the UK; 3) The British government should not negotiate a new free trade 
agreement with the EU at all.”
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C
oncerning opinions on 
the consequences of 
the referendum, there 
are important differen-
ces according to the partisan 
affiliation of respondents, inclu-
ding voters and national repre-
sentatives. Conservatives and 
DUP MPs are more optimistic 
than citizens who voted for the-
se parties in the 2015 national 
elections regarding both the si-
tuation of the national economy 
and the international role of the 
UK. Labour and SNP MPs tend 
to be more pessimistic than ci-
tizens, supporting these parties 
on both these aspects.
Figure 47.
Opinions about a popular vote on the UK-EU withdrawal agreement by 
country.
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Note: Wording of the question: “Some politicians and commentators suggest that the intergovernmental agreement that the UK 
needs to conclude before its actual withdrawal from the EU should be confirmed by a popular vote. Do you agree with this position? 
1)Yes; 2) No.”
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W
e now turn to analy-
se mass and elite 
attitudes over the 
withdrawal agree-
ment establishing the future UK-
EU relationship that the British 
government is negotiating with 
the European Commission and 
the other European leaders. Briti-
sh political elites are more prone 
than the general public to accept 
a new UK-EU free trade agree-
ment that allows citizens coming 
from EU member states to live 
and work in the UK. However, 
attitudes toward the UK-EU fu-
ture relationship differ along par-
ty lines. Conservatives and DUP 
MPs are polarised on this issue. 
While 60% of them prefer a new 
free trade agreement that does 
not allow freedom of movement 
of EU citizens, the other 40% 
would opt for a “softer” Brexit, 
which allows EU citizens to live 
in the UK. 75% of the Labour 
party MPs prefer the “softer” so-
lution as well, but the other 25% 
prefer a “no-deal solution.”
Figure 48.
Opinions about a popular vote on the UK-EU
withdrawal agreement by party affiliation.
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verall, the association 
between MPs’ attitu-
des toward a popular 
vote on the withdrawal 
agreement and their partisan affi-
liation is linear. The share of MPs 
who oppose the idea of a se-
cond referendum that would let 
British citizens decide on the wi-
thdrawal agreement linearly de-
creases moving from left to right.
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W
e also asked MPs 
whether they be-
lieve that the with-
drawal agreement 
Theresa May negotiated with 
the EU should be confirmed by a 
popular vote or not. In six out of 
seven member states included in 
our sample, the majority of MPs 
believe that the withdrawal agre-
ement should not be the object 
of a new popular vote. Only in 
Spain, more than 56% of MPs 
approve the idea to call a new 
referendum to allow voters to 
decide on it.
T
o shed more light on this 
issue, we also asked 
MPs in all seven sample 
countries which factors 
motivated their choices. 83% of 
MPs who are in favour of a new 
vote on the UK-EU agreement 
think that this should be an op-
portunity to bring such an impor-
tant treaty to the attention of the 
public. 74% of those who oppo-
se the idea of a new referendum 
on the withdrawal agreement be-
lieve instead that this should only 
be an excuse to overturn the re-
sult of the first referendum.
Figure 49.
Opinions about a popular vote on the UK-EU with-
drawal agreement by party affiliation (only in the UK).
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F
ocusing only on the British 
sample, we detect rele-
vant differences according 
to the MPs’ party affilia-
tions. While 87% of MPs belon-
ging to the Conservative Party 
or the Democratic Unionist Party 
are not in favour of a new popu-
lar vote on the withdrawal agre-
ement, 78% of Labour MPs and 
70% of the MPs affiliated with 
the Scottish National Party are in 
favour of calling a new referen-
dum to ratify the agreement.
61
Table 11.
Motivations behind the support for a popular vote 
on the withdrawal agreement.
Vote
Attention to the public 83,5%
Opportunity to turnover the result 16,5%
No vote
Confusion 25,6%
Excuse to turnover the result 74,4%
Note: Wording of the question: “Among the reasons why you agree with holding a se-
cond referendum, which of the following statements comes closest to your position? 1) 
A second referendum would be an opportunity to finally bring the substantive aspects 
and effects of Brexit to the attention of the public; 2) A second referendum would be 
an opportunity to overturn the problematic result of the first referendum / Among the 
reasons why you disagree with holding a second referendum, which of the following 
statements comes closest to your position? 1) A second referendum would be a mista-
ke because it would be even more complex and confusing for the voter than the first 
referendum; 2) A second referendum would be just an excuse to overturn the legitimate 
result of the first referendum.”
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Conclusions and 
recommendations8
E
uropean integration took 
off and then developed 
through time as an eli-
te project, facilitated by 
the “permissive consensus” of 
domestic voters. Our data con-
firm that national elites maintain 
a high degree of diffuse support 
for the integration process. In 
general, however, they tend to 
emphasize the economic dimen-
sion of the EU: market making, 
monetary unification, free move-
ment. They are less keen when 
it comes to expanding the EU’s 
role in the social domain.
T
his “social hesitancy” 
is not completely in line 
with mass preferences. 
The elite-mass incon-
gruence is especially pronoun-
ced when specific policy measu-
res are considered. This distance 
stands out in particular for pro-
posals related to financial help 
to member states facing sudden 
rises in poverty and unemploy-
ment – among the most dramatic 
developments during the recent 
crisis, which hit with particular vi-
rulence the European periphery. 
It must also be noted that some 
forms of pan-European solidarity 
are currently on the EU agenda, 
so preferences on these issues 
have a special political relevance 
today.
E
ven right-wing voters 
(the so-called populists) 
would favor a more so-
cial Europe. According 
to the common wisdom the last 
decades – and especially the 
current one – have witnessed 
a shift from permissive consen-
sus to constraining dissensus. 
However, it seems that the latter 
has not affected the social side 
of integration. When examining 
the declining support and loss 
of trust vis-à-vis the EU, one 
should thus seriously consider 
the hypothesis that such deve-
lopment may reflect less a desire 
to defend national sovereignty in 
general rather than a disillusion-
ment about the EU’s capacity to 
provide social protection in hard 
times or even be responsible for 
the increasing vulnerability many 
people are perceiving. Support 
for a more social Europe is cle-
arly observable also among Eu-
rosceptic voters. 
T
he social hesitancy of 
elites may be linked to 
pragmatic and feasibi-
lity considerations. As 
one would expect, it tends to 
vary according to left-right orien-
tations. But hesitancy and the 
opposition to social Europe re-
aches its peak among the poli-
tical elites of Northern member 
states – in our sample, especially 
Sweden and Germany. These eli-
tes are much more socially frigid 
than their own voters. And the 
highest degree of opposition is 
found among the German Chri-
stian democrats – the party of 
Merkel, Schäuble and Weidman, 
the champions of austerity since 
the beginning of the crisis. 
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Conclusions and 
recommendations
T
he North-South divide at 
the elite level thus stands 
out as the core source of 
political conflict and ide-
ational contrast in the EU today. 
This divide has revived an image 
of the EU as a utilitarian project 
driven by (mainly short-term) 
cost-benefit considerations by 
each member state. While it 
would be naïve and unreaso-
nable to neglect the weight of 
these motivations in any process 
of multi-national integration, the 
radicalization of the emphasis on 
“who pays and who gains” was 
not the only way to approach the 
crisis. Other, less divisive narra-
tives could have been chosen, 
compatible with (objective or po-
tential) citizen dispositions. 
T
his line of reasoning does 
not aim at justifying the 
behavior and policies of 
the Southern elites and 
their responsibility for some im-
portant aspects of the crisis. 
In addition, there is certainly a 
high degree of opportunism in 
Southern preferences for “solida-
rity”. However, the challenge for 
Europe now is less to determine 
who was/is right, but to move 
beyond short-term utilitarianism. 
For Southern elites, this means 
engaging and supporting con-
crete measures to regain credibi-
lity in terms of fiscal stability and 
compliance with EMU norms. 
For Northern elites, this means 
overcoming their inclination to 
“nationalize” blame and praise, 
acknowledging that EMU is not 
a mere collection of intrinsically 
determined national economies, 
but a complex adaptive system 
that requires a future-oriented 
“systemic” government, beyond 
short termism in the calculation 
of national gains and losses. 
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